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NUREMBERG’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Allan A. Ryan*
Abstract: This Article explores the establishment of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg beginning with the Moscow Declaration 
in 1943 and focusing on the Charter of the Tribunal in 1945, which, 
along with its charges, altered the course of international human rights 
law. Focusing on the way the Charter and its charges were devised, the au-
thor notes that the Tribunal’s existence was not a certainty after World 
War II and in fact it almost did not occur due to intense political debate 
that occurred in both domestic and international arenas. The Article ar-
gues that the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal was the most sig-
niªcant development in human rights law in the twentieth century, as it 
has been used as the model for the tribunals established to deal with the 
horrors that occurred in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Introduction 
 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) in 1945–
46 was the most signiªcant development in human rights law in the 
twentieth century. Although the trial of twenty-two leaders of Nazi Ger-
many by the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
was in itself a considerable accomplishment, the importance of Nur-
emberg lies chieºy in what the process ordained. Not simply a war 
crimes trial, it was also the ªrst true trial for violations of human rights, 
and serves as the bridge from the traditional law of war to the law of 
human rights that marked the latter half of the twentieth century. In 
doing so, Nuremberg changed forever the presumptions of national 
sovereignty, individual responsibility, and personal accountability that 
had underlain international law since the rise of nation-states three 
centuries before. 
 It did so by establishing three principles of utmost importance. 
First, the Charter of the Tribunal explicitly held individuals account-
able under international law for their actions. No longer could men 
claim that international law applied only to states and that they were 
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shielded from personal liability. Second, the Charter deªned a new 
category of crime— “crimes against humanity” —to overcome two tradi-
tional limitations of international law. Crimes against humanity deªned 
those actions the defendants had taken prior to World War II, or sepa-
rate from it, where the traditional law of war could not be applied.1 In 
addition, it deªned the crimes that Germany had committed against its 
own citizens, chieºy Jews—an arena that most considered beyond the 
reach of international law. “Crimes against humanity” had nothing to 
do with combat, weapons, or armies. Finally, it established that the 
leaders of an enemy nation could be held accountable in a judicial 
proceeding: a trial drawn largely from the Anglo-American adversarial 
tradition, including, remarkably, due process guarantees ªrst laid down 
in the U.S. Constitution of 1789. 
 For nearly ªfty years after its end, Nuremberg stood as an isolated 
episode—interesting and historically signiªcant, but unique; a chap-
ter that had marked the end of World War II, but had little applica-
tion to the hard realities of the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, 
however, and the United Nations (U.N.) moved to address the hor-
rors of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it turned to Nuremberg for its model 
and inalterably changed the course of human rights. 
 The signiªcance of Nuremberg is that it did not have to happen. 
It was the result of an intensely political process, both domestically 
and internationally, that played out before any judge donned a robe 
to hear the evidence of Nazi horrors. There was no precedent, no list 
of crimes to be charged, no guide as to how four different nations 
should proceed, and often no consensus on the purpose of the trial 
or what was to be achieved. The full story of Nuremberg is far beyond 
the scope of this work, but this Article focuses on how the charges 
were ªnally devised. One cannot understand Nuremberg without un-
derstanding that it was ªrst a political process that only later culmi-
nated in a trial and judgment. 
I. Background 
A. The Nature of Hitler’s War 
 The deªning characteristic of the Holocaust—Nazi Germany’s 
twelve-year campaign to annihilate the Jews of Europe—was the vast, 
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pervasive, and intricate network of government, party, and “private sec-
tor” resources that were deployed to carry it out. It would have been 
impossible to achieve such a result without concerted effort by virtually 
every organ of German life and their counterparts in puppet and oc-
cupied countries. 
 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933 as head of 
the National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP, or Nazi Party), and his 
government embarked on an insidious and increasingly intrusive pro-
gram to deprive German Jews of their civil and political rights.2 In 
1939, World War II began when Germany invaded Poland; in 1940, the 
Nazi war machine rolled westward through Holland and Belgium and 
into France; and in 1941 it turned eastward, invading the Soviet Union 
and quickly establishing its rule nearly to Moscow.3
 In 1941, special killing units traveled with or just behind the Ger-
man army as it moved eastward. Their task was to ªnd, remove, and kill 
Jews in those areas, which they did largely through ªring squads. This 
method of killing was inefªcient, time-consuming, and expensive, and 
so in 1941 Germany created the ªrst of four death camps on Polish soil. 
From that date until the Nazi collapse in 1945, some six million Euro-
pean Jews were dispossessed of their homes and property, separated 
from their families, transported by trains to the East, and put to death 
in gas chambers, their possessions conªscated and sent back to Berlin. 
As late as 1944, when the Allies had already landed in France and were 
pushing the German forces back to Berlin, Germany was rushing Hun-
garian Jews to their deaths at Auschwitz. To carry out this enormous 
campaign, Hitler created a new bureaucracy—the Reich Security Home 
Administration (RSHA)—which itself required the support and coop-
eration of a vast network of public bureaucracy and private industry: 
transportation, labor, military, banking and ªnance, diplomacy, and 
communications. 
 Relatively little of this had to do with war itself. Many elements of 
the German Army were implicated in war crimes and in the persecu-
tion of Jews, but the Holocaust was not a military offensive. It was a so-
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cial offensive, initiated in 1933 long before the war began. The death 
camps were behind the front lines, staffed and administered by the 
Nazi Party’s security organization, not the military. Jews interred or 
killed in concentration camps were not prisoners of war; they were kid-
napped civilians. 
B. The Beginnings of Nuremberg 
 The world had never seen anything like it: an entire government 
of a major world power, aided by a massive party organization and a 
sophisticated infrastructure of private industry, mobilized to eliminate 
the Jews of Europe. These developments were no secret to the Allies 
and on November 1, 1943, with the Allied invasion of Europe in ad-
vanced planning, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and 
Marshal Stalin issued the “Moscow Declaration,” promising that when 
the war was done: 
[T]hose German ofªcers and men and members of the Nazi 
party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consent-
ing part in [Nazi] atrocities, massacres and executions, will be 
sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds 
were done in order that they may be judged and punished ac-
cording to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free 
governments which will be created therein. . . . The above 
declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major 
criminals whose offences have no particular geographical lo-
calisation and who will be punished by a joint decision of the 
Governments of the Allies.4
 It was by no means clear, however, that the fate in store for the 
“major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical lo-
calisation” would be a trial.5 It was one thing to say that a German of-
ªcer who had overseen the roundup of Jews in a French village 
should be made to stand trial in France after the war; it was quite an-
other to conclude that the major Nazi leadership should have their 
fate decided by judges acting under rules of trial procedure and ac-
cording to evidence presented by lawyers. 
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 Only in the aftermath of the Allied invasion of Europe on June 6, 
1944 did attention turn to the question of how the Allies should deal 
with the vanquished Germany.6 On this question, there were two 
broad and competing schools of thought in Washington. One, led by 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., advocated that 
Germany and the Germans be harshly punished through a program 
of “pasturalization” that would effectively demolish German industry 
and render the nation a vassal state, powerless to consider aggression 
and war for generations to come.7 The other school of thought, led 
by Secretary of War Henry Stimson, would set Germany on its feet as 
soon as possible, restoring at least some degree of autonomy under 
occupation, and encouraging the Germans to understand that their 
salvation lay in peaceful and responsible partnership with the West.8
1. Stimson’s Proposal 
 The question of dealing with Nazi leaders was only one part of this 
broader debate, but it was an important part. Much of the wrangling 
over how to deal with the Gestapo (the state secret police), the Schutzstaf-
fel (SS) (the elite military unit that served as Hitler’s bodyguards and as 
a special police force), the leadership of the Nazi party, and those who 
had joined the party and its various tentacles of terror was driven by a 
fear that if Nazism itself was not thoroughly obliterated it would rise 
again.9 In September 1944, when German defeat seemed inevitable, 
Morgenthau presented to President Roosevelt a plan that called for 
“the arch-criminals of this war whose obvious guilt has generally been 
recognized by the UN” to be “apprehended as soon as possible” and 
“be put to death forthwith by ªring squads” of U.N. soldiers.10 Secre-
tary of War Stimson answered with a novel proposition: 
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(and Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin were known as the “Big Three”). Although the 
French were eventually to join as one of the four powers signing the Charter of the IMT, it 
was occupied by the Germans until the liberation of Paris in August, 1944; General de-
Gaulle, leader of the Free French in exile, was not included in summit meetings with Roo-
sevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. 
7 See, e.g., The Road to Nuremberg 28–29, 36–37 (Bradley F. Smith ed., 1981) [here-
inafter Smith, Road to Nuremberg]. 
8 See id. at 37, 38. 
9 See generally id. at 48–74. Nobody in Washington or London assumed that defeat of 
Nazi Germany would bring with it a quick and total repudiation of fascism, though that is 
exactly what happened. 
10 Henry Morgenthau Jr., Appendix B: Punishment of Certain War Crimes and Treat-
ment of Special Groups (Sept. 5, 1944), in American Road: The Documentary Record, 
supra note 4, at 28. 
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The method of dealing with these [“arch-criminals”] and 
other criminals requires careful thought and a well-deªned 
procedure. Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at 
least the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, no-
tiªcation to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard 
and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his de-
fense. . . . [T]he very punishment of these men in a digniªed 
manner consistent with the advance of civilization, will have 
all the greater effect upon posterity. . . . I am disposed to be-
lieve that at least as to the chief Nazi ofªcials, we should par-
ticipate in an international tribunal constituted to try them.11
Roosevelt was initially sympathetic to Morgenthau’s approach. In Lon-
don, too, the Lord Chancellor reported to the War Cabinet: 
I am strongly of the opinion that the method by trial, convic-
tion and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious 
ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and 
Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difªculties of consti-
tuting the court, formulating the charge, and assembling the 
evidence, the question of their fate is a political, not a judicial, 
question. It could not rest with judges, however eminent or 
learned, to decide ªnally a matter like this, which is of the 
widest and most vital public policy.12
The Lord Chancellor recommended that his government take the 
position that when “major criminals [fall] into Allied hands, the Allies 
will decide how they are to be disposed of, and the execution of this 
decision will be carried out immediately.”13
 Roosevelt and Churchill met in Quebec in mid-September 1944 
and reportedly saw eye-to-eye both on Morgenthau’s policy of crippling 
the German economy, and on the advantages of summary execution. 
When word of this impending policy leaked to the press, however, there 
was widespread criticism of such a harsh and vindictive plan, and, al-
ways sensitive to the political winds, Roosevelt retreated, leaving the 
matter an open question. Stimson, joined by Secretary of State Cordell 
                                                                                                                      
11 Communication from Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President (Sept. 9, 1944), 
in American Road: The Documentary Record, supra note 4, at 30–31. 
12 Lord Chancellor Sir John Simon, Major War Criminals, memorandum (Sept. 4, 
1944), in American Road: The Documentary Record, supra note 4, at 32. 
13 Colonel Murray C. Bernays, G-1, Subject: Trial of European War Criminals (Sept. 15, 
1944) [hereinafter Bernays], in American Road: The Documentary Record, supra note 
4, at 33. 
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Hull and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, took the opportunity 
to press the case for a trial, drafting for the President (though it was 
never sent to him) a plan that answered several troublesome issues: 
how to deal with a huge number of possible defendants whose individ-
ual trials would far exceed the Allies’ capacity; and how to reach atroci-
ties that had taken place before the war or apart from military action 
and thus were not war crimes, and were, in addition, directed by a gov-
ernment against its own citizens and thus arguably beyond the scope of 
traditionally understood international law.14 Stimson urged that the 
objective of prosecution should be “not only to punish the individual 
criminals, but also to expose and condemn the criminal purpose be-
hind each individual outrage,” expanding the world’s focus from indi-
vidual crimes to “the results of a purposeful and systematic pattern cre-
ated by [Nazi leaders] to the end of achieving world domination.”15 
This emphasis on the concerted effort of the Nazis—the forest rather 
than the trees—was to dominate U.S. thinking in both the planning 
and the eventual conduct of the trial at Nuremberg. 
 The proposal developed in the War Department was to conduct 
an initial trial on a charge of conspiracy, a uniquely Anglo-American 
legal concept that deªnes the plotting of a crime by two or more peo-
ple as a crime separate from the one they intend to commit.16 A per-
son is guilty of conspiracy if he does even a single overt act in further-
ance of it, and evidence of one conspirator’s evil acts can be used 
against all the other defendants, including those who did not partici-
pate in those acts or even know of them, so long as each defendant 
played some overt role toward the accomplishment of the conspiracy’s 
overall objective.17 No one had ever before suggested that conspiracy 
was a crime under international law. 
 As Colonel Bernays, of the War Department’s Special Project 
Branch, envisioned it, the Nazi party, the government and its state 
agencies, such as the SS, and their various leading ofªcials would be 
charged with “conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism, and the de-
                                                                                                                      
14 Draft Memorandum for the President from the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 
Subject: Trial and Punishment of European War Criminals (Nov. 11, 1944), in American 
Road: The Documentary Record, supra note 4, at 41–44. 
15 Id. at 44. 
16 Id. at 42–43. 
17 For example, if several people conspire to rob a bank, the murder of the bank guard 
in the course of the holdup incriminates, in a conspiracy to murder, those persons whose 
only role was to procure the weapons, regardless of whether they anticipated the murder 
or even opposed it. 
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struction of peaceful populations in violation of the laws of war.”18 This 
would provide a platform on which the entire Nazi program could be 
laid bare through documents and testimony. Following the certain con-
viction of these defendants in the main trial, there could be a series of 
subsequent trials in which any member of the government, the party, or 
its kindred agencies could be convicted of conspiracy merely upon 
proof of membership in the organization.19 The understanding was 
that these subsequent trials would be both sweeping and quick. 
 The proposal encountered opposition from the Army’s Judge Ad-
vocate General, and from the Justice Department, but through negotia-
tion and subtle redrafting of contentious points, Stimson, Secretary of 
State Hull, and Attorney General Francis Biddle were able to present a 
memorandum to President Roosevelt on January 22, 1945 that con-
tained the essence of the conspiracy/criminal organization theory, as 
well as the two-stage system of trials.20 The memo barely mentioned the 
word “conspiracy,” but spoke of a “premeditated criminal plan or en-
terprise, which either contemplated or necessarily involved” the com-
mission of “mass murders, imprisonments, expulsions and deportations 
of populations; the starvation, torture and inhuman treatment of civil-
ians; the wholesale looting of public and private property on a scale 
unparalleled in history; and, after initiation of ‘total’ war, its prosecu-
tion with utter ruthless disregard for the laws and customs of war.”21
 The very scope of the crimes—extending over twelve years and all 
of Europe—presented logistical problems of “appalling dimensions” in 
ªnding and organizing the evidence, in connecting speciªc crimes to 
speciªc individuals, and in staging the trials themselves.22 As the Secre-
taries stated, the prewar atrocities: 
[A]re neither “war crimes” in the technical sense, nor offenses 
against international law; and the extent to which they may 
have been in violation of German law, as changed by the Na-
zis, is doubtful. Nevertheless, the declared policy of the 
United Nations is that these crimes, too, shall be punished; 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Bernays, supra note 13, at 36. 
19 Though the draft proposal did not say so, the idea posed serious questions of fair-
ness: what an individual actually did—if indeed he had done anything at all—would be 
irrelevant, as would even his purpose or intent in joining the organization. 
20 See Memorandum for the President, Subject: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War 
Criminal ( Jan. 22, 1945) [hereinafter Jan. 22 Memorandum], in American Road: The 
Documentary Record, supra note 4, at 117–22. 
21 Id. at 118. 
22 Id. at 119. 
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and the interests of postwar security and a necessary rehabili-
tation of German peoples, as well as the demands of justice, 
require that this be done.23
Rejecting the idea of summary execution as “violative of the most fun-
damental principles of justice” (and likely to produce martyrs as well), 
the Secretaries further stated: 
We think that the just and effective solution lies in the use of 
the judicial method. Condemnation of these criminals after 
a trial, moreover, would command maximum public support 
in our own times and receive the respect of history. The use 
of the judicial method will, in addition, make available for all 
mankind to study in future years an authentic record of Nazi 
crimes and criminality.24
 The Secretaries stuck to the idea of two-stage process. First, an 
initial trial of the major German leaders and the organizations they 
led, charging defendants “both with the commission of their atrocious 
crimes, and also with joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise 
which included and intended these crimes, or was reasonably calcu-
lated to bring them about.”25 The criminal enterprise would be de-
ªned: 
[T]o permit full proof of the entire Nazi plan from its incep-
tion and the means used in its furtherance and execution, 
including the prewar atrocities and those committed against 
their own nationals, neutrals, and stateless persons, as well as 
the waging of an illegal war of aggression with ruthless disre-
gard for international law and the rules of war.26
The second stage would be individual trials of members who were 
members of the groups convicted at the ªrst trial in which membership 
would be sufªcient evidence of guilt. In a concession to those who had 
criticized the fairness of this idea, however, the Secretaries noted that, 
in addition to proof of membership, “[p]roof would also be taken of 
the nature and extent of the individual’s participation” so that punish-
ment “would be made appropriate to the facts of his particular case.”27
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 Several aspects of this proposal are noteworthy. The Secretaries 
were acutely aware that a conventional charge of war crimes would be 
inadequate to reach prewar crimes and the massive persecution of “ci-
vilians,” and could not illuminate the broad scope of the Third Reich’s 
terrors. The answer to that was the charge of conspiracy; the idea of 
new class of crimes, “crimes against humanity,” had not yet crystallized. 
For the ªrst time, the idea of “waging an illegal war of aggression” was 
proposed—though as an object of the conspiracy, not a crime in and of 
itself. Overall, the proposal was innovative, but not radical— “triumphs 
of caution and moderation.”28
2. International Stalemate 
 The impending meeting of the Big Three—the U.S., U.K., and 
Soviet Union—in Yalta in early February, 1945 hastened the creation 
of the memo, but much to the Secretaries’ disappointment, the Presi-
dent remained noncommittal and, worse, did not broach the subject 
at Yalta.29 The British, in the dark on these political maneuverings in 
Washington, were proceeding on the assumption that Hitler and the 
other top leaders would be summarily executed, and that lower-
ranking Nazis would be sent back for trial to the countries in which 
their crimes had taken place. The British invited a U.S. delegation to 
London in early April 1945 to work out a plan for dealing with war 
criminals, but the conference produced only ambiguity and stalemate. 
Lord Simon, the Lord Chancellor, proclaimed that he was “very wor-
ried by the prospect of a trial which might be drawn out almost in-
deªnitely, in which all sorts of things might be raised and discussed— 
whether legal or historical—leading to controversy and debate in the 
world at large, with a reaction which we can hardly calculate.”30 That 
same day he also asked: 
[W]hat is the real charge which Allied people and the world 
as a whole make against Hitler? It is the totality of his of-
fences against the international standard which civilized 
countries try to observe which make him the guilty man that 
he is. . . . If the method of public trial were adopted, the 
comment must be expected from the very start to be that the 
whole thing is a “put-up job” designed by the Allies to justify 
                                                                                                                      
28 American Road: The Documentary Record, supra note 4, at 56. 
29 Id. at 135. 
30 Memorandum to Judge Rosenman From Lord Simon (Lord Chancellor) (April 6, 
1945), in American Road The Documentary Record, supra note 4, at 151–52. 
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a punishment they have already resolved on. . . . [I]t is by no 
means unlikely that a long trial will result in a change of 
public feeling as to the justiªcation of trying Hitler at all. 
Will not some people begin to say “The man should be shot 
out of hand”? . . . . [I]s there not a danger of the trial being 
denounced as a farce?31
 Washington was unmoved. Responding to Simon, Assistant Secre-
tary of War John J. McCloy, who had become the driving force for war 
crimes policy in Stimson’s War Department, answered forcefully the 
contention that a trial would be unable to deal with the entire scope 
of Nazi depredations before the war and apart from it: 
It is true that all the Axis has done should be brought into the 
grounds of punishment. The offenses charged should include 
the preparation for war, the prewar atrocities and the launch-
ing of aggressive war in violation of Germany’s treaty obliga-
tions as well as the ruthless conduct of war in violation of in-
ternational law and custom. The very breadth of the offense, 
however, is not in itself argument against judicial action. It is a 
most important reason for a trial, for it is highly desirable that 
there be established and declared by actual decision, after 
adequate hearing and determination of the facts, the princi-
ples of international law applicable to the broad, vicious Nazi 
enterprise. In texture and application, this law will be novel 
because the scope of the Nazi activity has been broad and 
ruthless without precedent. The basic principles to be ap-
plied, however, are not novel and all that is needed is a wise 
application of those principles on a sufªciently comprehen-
sive scale to meet the situation. International law must de-
velop to meet the needs of the times just as the common law 
has grown, not by enunciating new principles but by adapting 
old ones . . . .32
Britain and the United States were talking past each other, and each 
was hardening its position. There was no word from the President, no 
guidance, no letter to Churchill urging quick resolution along U.S. 
lines. The U.S. delegation sat glumly in London, watching the entire 
enterprise unravel. 
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C. Creation of the International Military Tribunal Charter 
 Then, on April 12, President Roosevelt died. Harry Truman, “a 
man of quick and ªrm decision, little inclined to the artful, evasive tac-
tics of his predecessor,” was quickly briefed on the Stimson-Hull-Biddle 
memorandum and of the stalemate with the British over execution ver-
sus trial.33 He decided “that there must be a trial and that the basic 
American policy position was sound. Emboldened by the strong presi-
dential mandate that had so long eluded them, the American planners 
raced forward on a number of fronts.”34
1. Jackson’s Plan 
 Truman appointed U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson 
to take the newly created position of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecu-
tion of Axis Criminality. Characteristically, Jackson took immediate 
charge of U.S. policy, moving quickly and boldly to shape it to his lik-
ing. Over the next month, he and his new staff formulated an executive 
agreement for an “International Military Tribunal” with one judge and 
one alternate each from the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, 
and France to try the “major criminals” of the Axis powers.35 The 
agreement did not deªne the crimes to be charged, though it did de-
ªne several “criminal” acts, including “[l]aunching a war of aggression” 
and post-1933 “[a]trocities and offenses[,] . . . including atrocities and 
persecutions on racial or religious grounds” that were “in violation of 
any applicable provision of the domestic law of the country in which 
committed.”36
 The chief advantage of the conspiracy theory had been that it 
could reach all acts of the Nazi government and party from 1933. In the 
end, however, the defendants would be found guilty of conspiracy and 
not the acts themselves, which were thought to be beyond the compe-
tence of international law. Jackson’s early theory was that the crimes 
themselves could be punished if they were crimes under local law at the 
time they were committed. The obvious drawback to this theory, how-
ever, was that Hitler’s administration had changed many of Germany’s 
laws in the 1930s to allow precisely the persecution that followed. Jack-
                                                                                                                      
33 American Road: The Documentary record, supra note 4, at 138. 
34 Id. 
35 Executive Agreement Relating to the Prosecution of European Axis War Criminals 
(Drafts 3 & 4) (May 19, 1945), in American Road: The Documentary Record, supra note 
4, at 206. 
36 Id. 
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son’s plan preserved the principle of conspiracy by providing that the 
IMT should “apply the general rule” that crimes committed by one par-
ticipant in a “criminal plan” are attributable to all participants.37 The 
agreement he drafted was not centered on conspiracy as the unifying 
theme of the charges, as earlier U.S. versions had. That role was ªlled, 
in Jackson’s vision, by the charge of waging a war of aggression. 
 Jackson’s plan did preserve the idea that organizations could be 
tried and convicted by the IMT, but it took a further step away from 
making individual membership enough for conviction in future trials. 
Rather, an individual member of a convicted organization would bear 
the burden of proving “any circumstances relating to his membership 
or participation therein which are relevant either in defense or in miti-
gation.”38 This was profoundly ambiguous because Jackson’s plan did 
not even hint at what “defense” might be enough for an individual to 
establish or what “circumstances” might be “relevant” to that end. The 
plan left that task for further study by Jackson and the other prosecu-
tors. 
 In the face of this strong U.S. proposal, Jackson’s considerable 
persuasive powers, and the assent of France and the Soviet Union, the 
British War Cabinet gave in and abandoned its opposition to a trial. 
Plans were made for a conference in London to draw up the Charter 
of the Tribunal itself, based on Jackson’s plan. 
2. The Road to the Charter 
 As he departed for London in June 1945, Jackson briefed Presi-
dent Truman on his plan. The plan to proceed against the organiza-
tions had changed little, though Jackson acknowledged that individ-
ual members, following the presumed conviction of the organizations, 
would be allowed to prove “personal defenses or extenuating circum-
stances, such as that he joined under duress.”39 It was the case against 
the individual major Nazi criminals—though it was still uncertain who 
the defendants would be—that gave Jackson the stage on which to lay 
out the three charges that would eventually form the nucleus of the 
Charter. His orientation was both political and legal: 
Those acts which offended the conscience of our people were 
criminal by standards generally accepted in all civilized coun-
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tries, and I believe that we may proceed to punish those re-
sponsible in full accord with both our own traditions of fair-
ness and with standards of just conduct which have been in-
ternationally accepted.40
Nazi Germany was not “a legitimate state pursuing the legitimate ob-
jective of a member of the international community” but rather “a 
band of brigands who had seized the instrumentality of a state.”41
 Having thus separated the defendants from the state itself to 
charge them as individual bandits who had conspired with each other 
in a monstrous plan of persecution, aggression, and mass murder, Jack-
son laid out the three substantive charges. First, war crimes.42 Second, 
“atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on racial 
and religious grounds, committed since 1933.”43 Though he did not 
call them “crimes against humanity” at this point, Jackson boldly as-
serted that they had been “assimilated as a part of international law” by 
the Hague Convention of 1907.44 Jackson knew that no one could ar-
gue, or would want to, that the Nazi horrors had not offended civilized 
peoples, the “laws” of humanity, and the “dictates” of the public con-
science, but he surely knew that the Hague Convention had no thought 
of instituting these principles as international law.45 He used the Hague 
Convention as the legal platform on which to support “[t]he feeling of 
outrage” in the U.S. over the course of the war, so as to “punish acts 
which have been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain and have 
been so written in every civilized code.”46
 As the third charge, Jackson speciªed “[i]nvasions of other coun-
tries and initiation of wars of aggression in violation of International 
Law and treaties.”47 This crime came to be called “the crime against 
peace” in the Charter, or the “crime of aggressive war,” and he relied 
chieºy on the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, signed by most nations of 
the world, that renounced war as an instrument of national policy and 
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pledged to resolve international disputes by “paciªc” means.48 “This 
Pact constitutes only one in a series of acts which have reversed the 
viewpoint that all war is legal and have brought International Law into 
harmony with the common sense of mankind, that unjustiªable war is 
a crime,” Jackson wrote to the President.49 He continued: 
An attack on the foundations of international relations can-
not be regarded as anything less than a crime against the in-
ternational community. . . . We therefore propose to charge 
that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern Interna-
tional Law has abolished the defense that those who incite or 
wage it are engaged in legitimate business.50
 Jackson did not pretend, and indeed could not, that the trial 
would be applying well-settled principles. It would advance interna-
tional law into places it had never been, which is exactly what Jackson 
wanted: 
International Law is. . . . an outgrowth of treaties or agree-
ments between nations and of accepted customs. . . . Unless 
we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for 
International Law, we cannot deny that our own day has its 
right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that 
will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened 
International Law. International Law is not capable of devel-
opment by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting in-
ternational legislature. Innovations and revisions in Interna-
tional Law are brought about by the action of governments 
designed to meet a change in circumstances. . . . Hence I am 
not disturbed by the lack of precedent for the inquiry we 
propose to conduct . . . .51
 Telford Taylor, a gifted young Army lawyer on Jackson’s staff (and 
who succeeded Jackson as Chief of Counsel for the trials after the 
IMT), provided trenchant analysis that signiªcantly inºuenced Jack-
son’s presentation of his case at Nuremberg. According to Taylor, the 
trial’s most important accomplishment was: 
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To give meaning to the war against Germany. To validate the 
casualties we have suffered and the destruction and casualties 
we have caused. To show why those things had to be done. 
The conviction and punishment of Axis criminals are desir-
able objectives in themselves, but in order to accomplish the 
larger objectives the conviction and punishment must be ob-
tained by procedures and for reasons which will help to make 
the war meaningful and valid for the people of the Allied Na-
tions and, it is not beyond hope, for at least some people of 
the Axis nations.52
 Dividing the prosecution’s case into the “illegal launching” of wars 
of aggression phase and the “commission of atrocities” phase, Taylor 
dryly noted that the ªrst phase was: 
[B]ased on the assumption that it is, or will be declared, a 
punishable offense to plan and launch (and lose?) an aggres-
sive war, particularly if treaties are thereby violated. Although 
the phrase “illegal launching” is a “law idea”, and although 
much legal paraphernalia will be and must be invoked to vali-
date the assumption, the thing we want to accomplish is not a 
legal thing but a political thing.53
No one has ever analyzed the crime of aggressive war so well in so few 
words. Whether it is a punishable offense to launch an aggressive war, 
only those who lose it are likely to be tried, and therein lies the abid-
ing criticism of Nuremberg: that it was “victors’ justice,” the winners 
lashing out at the losers. Taylor’s recognition that acceptance of the 
illegal war doctrine would have to come from political consensus, not 
a judicial decree, is inarguably correct. Taylor dismissed “victors’ jus-
tice” in a single sentence: “Only the most incorrigible legalists can 
pretend to be shocked by the conclusion that the perpetrator of an 
aggressive war acts at peril of being punished for his perpetration, 
even if no tribunal has ever previously decided that perpetration of 
aggressive war is a crime.”54 As to the atrocities, still a legal dilemma 
insofar as they were not traditional war crimes, Taylor had a similar 
rebuttal: 
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No one will be shocked by the doctrine that people who di-
rect or do inhuman and barbarous things in the course of 
losing a war will be punished. Many would be shocked by the 
conclusion that such people may go scot–free unless a pre-
existent law or rule can be cited.55
 Taylor had brilliantly identiªed the plan’s greatest strength and its 
most prominent weakness. Contrary to the assumptions that had 
guided U.S. war crimes planning up to that point, Taylor declared pun-
ishment incidental, for how can there be meaningful “punishment” for 
crimes so calculated, vast, and hideous? The purpose of the trial was the 
trial itself: to show the world, present and future, by fair procedures, 
that the destruction and casualties that the Allies had caused were nec-
essary to end the Third Reich. 
 Jackson and his counterparts met in London during the summer 
of 1945 to draft the Charter of the Tribunal, to prescribe the proce-
dures that it would follow, to choose the defendants, and to draft the 
indictment. It was not a smooth summer. Jackson was innately suspi-
cious of the Russians, and held out until the end the possibility that 
the U.S. might go their own way, with or without the British and 
French, leaving the Russians to try what they would. The idea of con-
spiracy as a separate crime bafºed the French and the Russians, and 
the British and the U.S. were at loggerheads over the size of the trial. 
The idea of aggressive war as a crime concerned the other three na-
tions, and the French-Soviet counterproposal—that aggressive war be 
characterized as a crime only when undertaken by the Axis—was 
anathema to Jackson, who saw that aggressive war could only be a 
crime under international law if it applied to all nations. The British, 
meanwhile, were reluctant to explore too deeply the economic and 
ªscal aspect of the rise of the Reich, lest it cast too much light on the 
role of British banks in the 1930s. The idea of trying organizations 
ªrst, and then running their members through summary trials after-
wards, continued to pose persistent questions of procedure and fair-
ness, and the Soviets could not understand why it was necessary to put 
the organizations on trial when the Allies had already condemned 
them as criminal outªts. 
 The very nature of the trial itself was proving difªcult to agree 
upon, with the French and the Russians accustomed to the continental, 
or inquisitorial, system where the judge marshaled the evidence and 
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questioned the witnesses, and the British and the Americans pushing 
for an adversarial process, with lawyers presenting the evidence before 
neutral judges and each side vigorously cross-examining the witnesses 
called by the other. Even the logistics of preparing for the trial were 
vexing: there were not enough translators for the documents being 
brought in by the boxful, and the parties did not even agree that Nur-
emberg should be the site until late in the summer. On top of that, the 
search for evidence was not proceeding quickly, nor producing very 
auspicious results, particularly on the critical elements of conspiracy. 
Jackson had begun the summer thinking that the other Allies would 
quickly understand that his plan was the obvious roadmap for a trial. 
They did not, and he had little patience for their criticism, questions, 
and redrafted charters. 
II. Discussion 
 In the end, Jackson—largely—prevailed. The Charter of the IMT, 
issued on August 8, 1945, was an enormously important document— 
more important in many ways than the eventual judgment of the Tribu-
nal itself, because the Charter created the Tribunal and bound the 
judges to its terms.56 The Charter deªned three charges: (1) war crimes, 
which had never been controversial; (2) “crimes against humanity,” 
which was intended to reach the depredations against civilians before 
and during the war; and (3) “crimes against peace,” the “planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in viola-
tion of international treaties.”57
A. The Deªnition of Crimes Under the Charter 
 The drafting and redrafting of the Charter in such a contentious 
atmosphere had left its deªnitions far from perfect. The Charter de-
ªned crimes against humanity to include crimes “before or during the 
war” and the drafters speciªcally rejected the requirement that they be 
in violation of the domestic law in the country of their commission.58 
At ªrst reading the deªnition seemed broad enough: “murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts commit-
ted against any civilian population . . . or persecutions on political, ra-
cial or religious grounds . . . .”59 But there was an important 
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qualiªcation: such crimes must have been committed “in execution of 
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal.”60 Since the Nazi campaign against the Jews before the war began 
could not fairly be characterized as “in execution of” or “in connection 
with” either aggressive war or war crimes, the effect of this limitation 
was to exclude the persecution of Jews before 1939. 
 In addition, the Charter sharply curtailed the conspiracy theory, 
which had been the foundation of U.S. policy. As Jackson had originally 
drafted it, conspiracy was a fourth crime, equal to the other enumer-
ated categories of crimes. A British revision, however, had placed the 
conspiracy provision within the paragraph deªning crimes against 
peace, so the Charter provided that conspiracy to wage aggressive war 
was a crime, but there was no similar provision for a conspiracy to 
commit war crimes or, signiªcantly, crimes against humanity. This was a 
“disastrous blow” to the original U.S. proposal.61 “[W]hile it might 
plausibly be urged that prewar anti-Jewish actions were a necessary part 
of a conspiracy to perpetrate greater atrocities after the war came, it was 
difªcult to argue that the prewar harassment of Jews was a necessary 
preparation for aggressive war.”62
 In the end, these provisions caused less mischief than they might 
have caused. The Tribunal, in its judgment, appeared to make a point 
of declaring the limitations technical and unimportant: 
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt 
whatever that political opponents were murdered in Germany 
before the war, and that many of them were kept in concen-
tration camps in circumstances of great horror and cru-
elty. . . . The persecution of Jews during the same period is es-
tablished beyond all doubt. . . . The Tribunal is of the opinion 
that revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it 
has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in exe-
cution of, or in connection with, any such crime. The Tribu-
nal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts 
before 1939 were Crimes against Humanity within the mean-
ing of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 
war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also 
crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts 
charged in the indictment, and committed after the begin-
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ning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were all 
committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggres-
sive war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity.63
1. Rejection of the Acts of State and Superior Order Defenses 
 In addition to the deªnition of the crimes, Article 7 of the Charter 
speciªcally provided that the “ofªcial position” of the defendants as 
high government ofªcials “shall not be considered as freeing them 
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”64 As Jackson stated: “We 
do not accept the paradox that legal responsibility should be the least 
where power is the greatest.”65 Related to that was the Article 8 provi-
sion, which stated that “the fact that a Defendant acted pursuant to an 
order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from re-
sponsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”66 Contrary to what has 
become popular opinion, the IMT at Nuremberg did not introduce the 
theory that “I was just following orders” is not a defense. That prohibi-
tion had existed under the codes of many nations, including the 
United States and Germany, since World War I or before. The Nurem-
berg Charter, however, applied it directly and forcefully. The very act of 
bringing charges against individual men, and putting them in the dock 
to answer those charges, stripped of any defense of ofªcial immunity or 
superior orders, was an enormous step.67 In his opening statement, 
Jackson told the judges: 
[T]he idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits 
crimes, is a ªction. Crimes always are committed only by per-
sons. While it is quite proper to employ the ªction of respon-
sibility of a state or corporation for the purpose of imposing a 
collective liability, it is quite intolerable to let such a legalism 
become the basis of personal immunity. 
 The Charter recognizes that one who has committed 
criminal acts may not take refuge in superior orders nor in 
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the doctrine that his crimes were acts of states. These twin 
principles working together have heretofore resulted in im-
munity for practically everyone concerned in the really great 
crimes against peace and mankind. . . . Under the Charter, 
no defense based on either of these doctrines can be enter-
tained.68
B. The Indictment and the Trial 
 The trial itself began with Jackson’s opening, followed by open-
ing statements by the chief prosecutors of the three other nations, on 
November 21, 1945.69 There were twenty-two individual defendants.70 
The prosecution also charged six organizations as being criminal or-
ganizations under Article 9 of the Charter.71
 The indictment was a lengthy document, alleging four counts.72 
Count I charged each defendant with having “participated as leaders, 
organizers, instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution 
of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the 
commission of, Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against 
Humanity” and, as co-conspirators are, “individually responsible for 
their own acts and for all the acts committed by any persons in the exe-
cution of” the plan or conspiracy.73 Count II charged sixteen of the 
twenty-two defendants with crimes against peace, in that they “partici-
pated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of 
aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, 
agreements and assurances.”74
                                                                                                                      
68 Robert H. Jackson, Prosecutor’s Address of Nov. 21, 1945 [hereinafter Jackson, 
Prosecutor’s Address], in 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 63, at 150. 
69 Id. 
70 The twenty-two individuals charges were Hermann Goering, Rudolph Hess, Joachim 
von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, 
Wilhelm Frick, Jules Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Karl Doenitz, Erich Raeder, 
Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Franz von Papen, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 
Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath, Hans Fritzsche, and Martin Bormann. 
71 The six organization charged were the Reich Cabinet; the Leadership Corps of the 
Nazi Party; the SS, generally speaking the Party’s executive branch, and also its security 
and intelligence arm; the SD, the secret state police, known as the Gestapo; the SA, or 
Brownshirts, an early group of Party fascists who were subjugated by the SS in 1934; and 
the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. 
72 It took an entire day to read the indictment at trial. See Indictment, International 
Military Tribunal [hereinafter IMT Indictment], in 22 Trial of the Major War Crimi-
nals, supra note 63, at 30–94. 
73 Id. at 31. 
74 Id. at 43–44. 
76 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:55 
 Count III charged eighteen of the defendants with war crimes be-
tween the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 and surrender. 
Speciªcally, the indictment charged “methods of combat and of mili-
tary occupation in direct conºict with the laws and customs of war, and 
the perpetration of crimes committed on the ªeld of battle during en-
counters with enemy armies, against prisoners of war, and in occupied 
territories against the civilian population of such territories.”75 There 
followed fourteen pages of speciªcs, setting forth in considerable detail 
such events as murder and ill-treatment of civilians in occupied areas, 
deportation of civilians for slave labor, murder and ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war, killing of hostages, plunder of public and private 
property, and the wanton destruction of towns not justiªed by military 
necessity.76
 Finally, Count IV charged eighteen defendants with crimes against 
humanity, specifying (in broad detail but with considerably less detail 
than Counts II and III), the murder, extermination, enslavement, and 
deportation of civilian populations before and during the war, and the 
persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds of Jews and of 
others thought to be “in conºict with the aims of the Nazis.”77
C. The Judgment of the Tribunal 
 The trial continued, with some breaks, until August 31, 1946 when 
the eight judges retired to consider their verdicts.78 They deliberated 
for a month and read their judgment over the course of two days be-
fore a packed courtroom and the world’s press.79 The judgment itself, 
though justly famous, is somewhat anticlimactic. The Tribunal did not 
consider itself at liberty to expand or contract the Charter’s provisions, 
or even to question them. The crimes it judged were the crimes the 
Charter deªned, no more and no less; the defenses it disallowed, such 
as the doctrine of superior orders, it disallowed because the Charter 
said that it must do so. “The law of the Charter is decisive,” said the 
judges, “and binding upon the Tribunal.”80 Of seventy-four counts in 
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the indictment, the Court returned guilty verdicts on ªfty-two and not-
guilty verdicts on twenty-two. Fifteen of the defendants were acquitted 
of at least one charge while seven were convicted on all counts.81
 Count I of the Indictment, charging participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy, fared the worst; although the indictment charged 
all twenty-two of the defendants with it, the court acquitted fourteen of 
them after ªrst ruling that, because of the way the Charter was drafted, 
the conspiracy count pertained only to the charge of aggressive war, 
and thus the indictments alleging conspiracy to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity were invalid.82 Each of the eight defendants 
convicted of conspiracy in that respect was also convicted of Count II, 
which was the charge of aggressive war itself (or “crimes against peace” 
in the Charter’s terminology). Four of the defendants convicted of ag-
gressive war were acquitted of the conspiracy count and four more were 
acquitted of both. As to war crimes, sixteen of the eighteen defendants 
so charged were convicted, and as to crimes against humanity, there 
were likewise sixteen convictions on eighteen indictments. Apart from 
the misªt conspiracy count, there were convictions on forty-four of the 
remaining ªfty-two counts, including twenty-eight on the thirty-two 
counts of war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
1. The Court’s Reasoning 
 The Charter required that the Tribunal give the reasons on 
which its judgment was based, and the judges produced a 154-page 
document that discussed the evidence in detail and weighed each of 
the counts of the indictment against each individual defendant and 
the six organizations charged as criminal. It is an orderly and lawyerly 
treatise, beginning with a lengthy historical account of the rise of Na-
zism in Germany; the re-armament and the planning of war and the 
occupations of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938; the opening of 
war against Poland in 1939, followed by the invasions of Norway and 
Denmark in 1940, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and 
then Yugoslavia and Greece, and ªnally the Soviet Union, all in 1941; 
and the declaration of war against the United States six months later. 
The judges concluded that these were aggressive acts of war, not un-
dertaken in self-defense or at the invitation of the victims. They were 
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undertaken to expand German power and territory; to secure critical 
natural resources, ports and other strategic advantages for the con-
tinuation of the war; to neutralize neighboring countries that might 
threaten German expansion; and to strengthen Germany’s grip on 
Europe. Because the Charter deªned the crime against peace as a war 
of aggression or a war “in violation of international treaties, agree-
ments or assurances,”83 the court went on to point out that the Ger-
man invasion of Western Europe violated a number of treaties and 
agreements of nonaggression that Germany had made with its victims, 
both before and during the defendants’ reign.84
 In addition, the Court was plainly concerned at the defense, vigor-
ously asserted by the defendants’ lawyers and which lingers today, that 
the charge of crimes against peace was fundamentally unfair because 
aggressive war had never before been deªned as a crime. Nullem crimen 
sine lege was the time-honored principle: no crime unless a law makes it 
so, at the time it was done.85 The Court stated that the maxim reºects a 
“principle of justice,” and as such it cannot be applied to protect those 
“who in deªance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring 
states without warning . . . for in such circumstances the attacker must 
know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish 
him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.”86 
The defendants “must have known that they were acting in deªance of 
all international law when in complete deliberation they carried out 
their designs of invasion and aggression.”87
 Turning aside this argument did not solve the more troublesome 
underlying contention that the Tribunal clearly wanted some afªrma-
tive ground to justify a conclusion that aggressive war was not merely 
unlawful but an actual crime.88 It turned to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty 
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of 1928.89 That treaty had committed its signatories to resolve “disputes 
or conºicts of whatever nature or whatever origin” only by “paciªc 
means.”90 According to the Tribunal, “the solemn renunciation of war 
as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition 
that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan 
and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are 
committing a crime in so doing.”91 The Court invoked the words of 
U.S. Secretary of State (later Secretary of War) Stimson in 1932— sig-
niªcantly, before the Nazis came to power in Germany and thus not a 
self-serving criticism of Hitler’s aggression—that the Kellogg-Briand 
Treaty had made war “an illegal thing” and those nations that engage in 
it “law breakers.”92
 Still, Stimson had not said—quite—that it was a crime. The Court 
pointed out that the Hague Convention of 1907, prohibiting mis-
treatment of prisoners and the use of poisoned weapons among other 
forbidden acts of war, had not actually said that those were crimes, and 
yet military courts had no difªculty in punishing those who had done 
them; waging war was “equally illegal, and of much greater moment,” 
than those.93 Clearly echoing Jackson, the judges went on, 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the 
customs and practices of states which gradually obtained uni-
versal recognition, and from the general principles of justice 
applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. This law is 
not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a 
changing world.94
 Further seeking to shore up the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Court 
cited a resolution of the League of Nations in 1927, and two earlier 
League protocols that had never been formally ratiªed, all of which 
explicitly condemned wars of aggression as an “international crime.”95 
It pronounced itself satisªed that “[t]he prohibition of aggressive war 
demanded by the conscience of the world” means that “resort to a war 
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of aggression is not merely illegal, but is criminal.”96 “War is essen-
tially an evil thing,” the Court said.97 It continued: 
Its consequences are not conªned to the belligerent states 
alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggres-
sion, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the 
supreme international crime differing only from other war 
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of 
the whole.98
 With that point out of the way, the Tribunal had no difªculty re-
jecting defendants’ arguments that the law of war applied only to states, 
not to individuals. The Charter itself obviously foreclosed that argu-
ment, because it authorized the indictment and conviction of these 
very defendants, and the Court could hardly entertain an argument 
that it should overturn the Charter that had created it and had directed 
it to pass judgment on those defendants. It did point out that individual 
soldiers had long been tried and sentenced for mistreatment of prison-
ers and other war crimes—as if to suggest, perhaps, that the idea of sub-
jecting individuals to international law was not a particularly new or 
startling idea.99
 But of course it was. Soldiers, and before them, pirates, had indeed 
been put on trial for war crimes or piracy, though always by one-nation 
courts or military tribunals. The law applied to them was “interna-
tional” law in the sense that all nations, more or less, adhered to it, but 
this was not a very important part of those proceedings. The defen-
dants were on trial for individual acts of violence. Nuremberg was alto-
gether new and different: the court was convened by four nations act-
ing together (and supported by many others); the defendants were not 
soldiers; and the charges went far beyond war crimes, although they 
were included. The defendants were government ofªcials, generals and 
admirals, a publisher, a banker, and diplomats; their crimes were state 
policies they had developed and implemented. The head of state would 
have been in the dock had he not killed himself. The Court was cover-
ing a lot of territory when, reºecting Robert Jackson’s rhetoric, it pro-
nounced, “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not 
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by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”100
2. Elaboration on the Superior Orders Defense 
 Then, in one of its few truly inscrutable passages, the Tribunal 
summarily rejected the defendants’ argument that they were only car-
rying out Hitler’s orders. Article 8 of the Charter had speciªcally 
taken that defense off the table, but the Court went on to add: 
The provisions of this article are in conformity with the law 
of all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in 
violation of the international law of war has never been rec-
ognized as a defense to such acts of brutality. . . . The true 
test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of 
most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether 
moral choice was in fact possible.101
“Moral choice” has an odd ring in this context. Neither the Charter 
nor the “law of most nations” takes “moral choice” as the test of 
whether a soldier may plead superior orders as a valid defense, and 
that would be a very difªcult test to apply. When does a soldier not 
have a moral choice? The choice may put him in a perilous position 
indeed, if he elects to disobey the order, but nonetheless it is there. A 
soldier who is given a direct order to kill a prisoner of war, for exam-
ple, or to lay mortar ªre on a known hospital, is required to disobey it 
and if he does not he is guilty of a war crime, the order notwithstand-
ing. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which disobedience of such 
an order is such an intimidating prospect for a young private in a war 
zone that a judge might be compassionate in handing down a sen-
tence, but the order does not wash the crime away. If soldiers “do not 
cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another 
and to God,”102 one might ask the Tribunal, when is moral choice not 
possible? The Tribunal did not elaborate on what it might have meant, 
and its pronouncement has been generally ignored in the subsequent 
development of the law of war. 
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 It is also worth noting the very careful wording of Article 8: “The 
fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or 
of a superior shall not free him from responsibility” for his act.103 The 
existence of the order does not, in and of itself, exculpate the defen-
dant. The accepted law of superior orders is actually a bit more subtle 
than that. It provides that superior orders is not a defense if the sol-
dier knew or should have known that the order was illegal. One can 
imagine a situation where a soldier does not know an order is illegal, 
not because he is ignorant of the law but because he might be igno-
rant of the facts. If he is ordered to shell a church because it is being 
used as an enemy observation post, and if it should turn out that it is 
still being used only as a church, then he has committed an act that 
violates the laws of war—destroying a place of worship. Here, however, 
he can plead superior orders as a defense, because he did not know 
and could not have been expected to know, given the circumstances, 
that what he was doing was illegal. Thus, Article 8 provided that a su-
perior’s order was not an automatic defense, which is certainly true, 
but it did not delve into the circumstances that might make it a de-
fense, and the Tribunal added nothing of value by its enigmatic ob-
servation that “moral choice” was the true test of a superior-orders 
defense. 
3. Setbacks in the Judgment 
 Returning to the charges of the indictment, the Court handed the 
prosecution two setbacks. First, it ruled that the indictment was invalid 
under the Charter insofar as it charged conspiracy to commit war 
crimes and conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity.104 It had 
always been the U.S. intention to make conspiracy a crime that incor-
porated the entire Nazi scheme—not only waging the war but commit-
ting war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, as the Charter 
was shufºed and reshufºed in the London negotiations, the critical 
language— “or participat[ion] in the formulation or execution of a 
Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan” —was moved from the end of Article 6, where “foregoing” 
would have included all the crimes, to the paragraph deªning crimes 
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against peace.105 Thus “foregoing” related only to that crime, not the 
others. 
 Second, the Court held that while a conspiracy to wage aggressive 
war “has been established beyond doubt,” that conspiracy did not begin 
in the early days of the Nazi party, as the prosecution had contended.106 
To be a conspiracy, there must be a “concrete plan,” and there was no 
such plan for aggressive war until the mid-1930s.107 Consequently, the 
Court would look to what each defendant had done beginning at that 
time to determine his guilt. Those who had left the scene before then, 
as a few of the defendants had, would be acquitted on that charge. 
4. Tribunal’s Findings on War Crimes 
 With the difªculties of aggressive war and conspiracy behind it, the 
Tribunal turned to the evidence of war crimes, and here it had no 
difªculty. War crimes had always been the least controversial of the four 
charges, because it was ªrmly rooted in the law of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and each of the four Allies was entirely familiar 
with what “violations of the laws or customs of war” comprised.108 
Moreover, the evidence was overpowering. “The truth remains that war 
crimes were committed on a vast scale, never before seen in the history 
of war. . . . [W]ar crimes were committed when and wherever . . . 
thought . . . to be advantageous. They were for the most part the result 
of cold and criminal calculation.”109
5. Charges Against Nazi Organizations 
 The Court then turned to its penultimate task—the charges 
against the organizations. It was a nightmarish task just to determine 
how these organizations were deªned, particularly those that went 
through repeated rounds of reorganization and consolidation with 
both state and party ofªces, and whose missions and responsibilities 
were constantly adjusted, ofªcially and unofªcially. Was someone who 
joined the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) (the German intelligence service) in 
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1944 joining the same organization that had existed in 1939? Was a 
soldier in the Waffen SS—its military arm—a member of the same or-
ganization as a henchman in its domestic security operation? 
 But the Tribunal had a more serious concern. Mindful that un-
der the Charter a declaration of an organization’s criminality would 
lead the way to summary convictions of its members, the Tribunal 
warned, “this is a far-reaching and novel procedure. Its application, 
unless properly safeguarded, may produce great injustice.”110 More-
over, it was plainly troubled by the thought of assembly-line convic-
tions by a host of U.S., British, French, and Soviet courts operating 
independently, under their own laws and subject to domestic political 
demands, and handing out penalties including death. It recom-
mended that “so far as possible,” the Four Powers should agree on a 
standard set of “classiªcations, sanctions, and penalties” for use in the 
subsequent trials.111
 The Tribunal’s most signiªcant pronouncement was that member-
ship in a criminal organization alone would not be enough to convict 
an individual. In doing so, the Tribunal came very close to negating the 
Charter itself,112 but the judges ªnessed this point by reasoning that an 
organization, to be criminal, must be “a group bound together and or-
ganized for a common purpose,” a deªnition which would “exclude 
persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the 
organization . . . .”113 Membership alone, therefore, could not support 
a conviction because some members might have had no knowledge of 
the organization’s criminal purposes. Whether the judges intended it 
or not, this ruling sounded the death knell for subsequent trials based 
on group membership. The prosecution would have had to prove each 
individual’s state of knowledge at the time he joined, and perhaps 
prove his intent and even his actual role in the organization as well. It 
would have been impossible to do that for the hundreds of thousands 
of SS and Nazi “Leadership Corps” members; even the Gestapo, with 
15,000 or so members, presented a daunting prospect. The idea was 
abandoned and no one was tried by the U.S. for membership alone.114
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 Dealing with each of the groups in turn, the Court held that the 
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was a criminal organization, but it 
exempted those who had left the leadership before the beginning of 
the war.115 It reached similar conclusions as to the Gestapo, the SD, and 
the SS—each one a criminal organization—as to those who knew its 
purposes and became or remained members after the war began.116 
The tribunal found that the SA was a criminal organization within the 
meaning of the Charter, though it was virtually defunct after 1934. Both 
the Reich Cabinet and the General Staff and High Command (the 
highest-ranking military advisers to Hitler) were found not criminal, on 
grounds that they were not really “organizations” but a few score 
ofªcials who could be tried one by one for their individual acts as the 
evidence might justify.117 Perhaps fearing that the “acquittal” of the 
General Staff and High Command as a criminal organization might be 
read as an exoneration of the German military leadership (whose de-
fense at trial had been that everything was Hitler’s idea and they could 
do nothing to stop him), the judges had particularly harsh words: 
[These ofªcers] have been responsible in large measure for 
the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions of 
men, women, and children. They have been a disgrace to the 
honorable profession of arms. Without their military guid-
ance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow-Nazis 
would have been academic and sterile. . . . When it suits their 
defense they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hit-
ler’s brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within 
their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth 
is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent 
and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a 
scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had 
the misfortune to know . . . .118
 The judges concluded their written opinion with a ªnal section 
discussing the evidence as it pertained to each individual defendant, 
reaching its verdict on each charge against that particular defendant 
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before moving on to the next. Of the nineteen convicted, twelve were 
hung and seven imprisoned on terms ranging from ten years to life.119
IV. Analysis 
 Was it a fair trial? The fact that nineteen of twenty-two were con-
victed does not by itself tell us anything on that score; one should never 
confuse the fairness of the trial with the strength of the prosecution’s 
case. Nor does the fact that not all defendants were truly “major” war 
criminals, or that many others of equal responsibility might have been, 
but were not, tried with them, shed light on the question of how these 
defendants, however chosen, were treated. As Telford Taylor stated: 
In Germany the widespread responsibility for these crimes 
among the German leaders in the ªelds of government, arms, 
and industry posed problems not only of law but of judicial 
administration which were of truly staggering proportions. At 
the same time, the collapse and virtual disappearance of the 
German Government, the total and crushing defeat of Japan, 
and the intellectual and moral vacuum created in both those 
countries by years of tyranny followed by utter disaster, meant 
that the entire responsibility for stating the principles and 
shaping the policies in the ªeld of war crimes was and had to 
be discharged by the victorious powers.120
But, Jackson cautioned: 
We must never forget that the record on which we judge 
these defendants today is the record on which history will 
judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned 
chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon 
such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that 
this Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulªlling human-
ity’s aspirations to do justice.121
 Did the Nuremberg process do that? While fairness is to some ex-
tent a subjective judgment, one may identify speciªc procedures that, 
in the United States and elsewhere since the eighteenth century, have 
been generally accepted as providing such protection to the defendant 
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that it might be said that any trial that includes them is a fair one. Such 
procedures would include: 
• Notice to the defendants of the charges against them, and ade-
quate opportunity before trial to prepare a defense to the charges. 
• The assistance of counsel. 
• The right to be present at the trial, and to have it conducted in 
one’s own language or with full translation. 
• A presumption of innocence, and the burden of proving guilt on 
the prosecution, with the defendant to be acquitted if guilt is not 
clearly proven (“beyond a reasonable doubt” or some compara-
ble standard). 
• A verdict rendered by a neutral and objective judge or jury, based 
only on the evidence properly brought before the court. 
• The right to confront witnesses for the prosecution, and to cross-
examine them. 
• The right to call witnesses or introduce other evidence on one’s 
own behalf. 
• Trial open to the public and the press. 
• The right not to be a witness against one’s self, but to testify on 
one’s own behalf if desired. 
• The right to an appeal of the judgment. 
 Measured against these ten criteria, the IMT was plainly a “fair” 
one. The Charter safeguarded all of the protections save the right to 
appeal. The defendants were given notice of the charges through the 
indictment, thirty days before the trial began, and they had German 
counsel of their choosing, many of whom were high caliber. The prose-
cution had the burden of proof and the judges—with the likely excep-
tion of the two Soviet judges, whose system did not acknowledge an in-
dependent judiciary, and who dissented from all acquittals—were in 
every objective sense neutral, basing their decisions of guilt or inno-
cence on the evidence and the law as deªned by the Charter. The Tri-
bunal allowed the defendants to testify or not as they chose, to call wit-
nesses, and to introduce documentary evidence.122
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 It is impossible to read the lengthy opinion of the judges and not 
conclude that they diligently and responsibly weighed the evidence 
against the law and reached careful decisions on each count. One can 
of course quarrel with some of the individual verdicts, but if the fair-
ness of the trial is to be judged by the care and restraint in the judg-
ment itself, the Tribunal comes out well. The judges rejected the 
prosecution’s assumption that conspiracy applied to all counts; it 
strongly curbed the case against the organizations; it acquitted a ma-
jority of the defendants on at least one count and set three of them 
free altogether. Although the Court condemned the Nazis’ deeds in 
the strongest language, the judgments themselves were measured and 
always anchored to the evidence. 
 For some, the cloud of suspicion lingering over the trial has not 
been dispelled because the crimes of which the defendants stood 
charged were to some extent reºected in the Allies’ own conduct—the 
internment of Japanese-Americans in the United States, the destruction 
of cities by Allied bombing raids, and the massacre of Polish ofªcers by 
Soviets at Katyn Forest in Poland in 1942 (a charge which, incredibly, 
the Soviets pressed to have included in the indictment as having been 
done by Germans). While it is true that the Allies’ conduct was not, at 
all times and in every respect, above reproach, there was, literally, a 
world of difference between Germany’s aggressive conquests and devas-
tating persecution and death, and the Allies’ response. The purpose of 
the trial, after all, was to judge the Nazis, not the Allies, and the Allies 
did not forfeit their moral authority because they had sometimes acted 
unwisely or excessively in responding to the Nazi threat. By that time, 
this was also the consensus of the world community: the General As-
sembly of the U.N., a few weeks after the IMT’s judgment, unanimously 
afªrmed the “principles of international law recognized by the Charter 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.”123
                                                                                                                      
from Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of U.S. naval forces in the Paciªc, stating that 
U.S. submarines had engaged in unrestricted submarine warfare as well. Based on that 
afªdavit, the Tribunal absolved Doenitz of the charge. Although perhaps atypical, it is one 
example of how the protections of due process were extended in fact, not just in theory. 
Taylor, supra note 61, at 399–409. As Taylor points out, the defense tactic had to do with 
the deªnition of “merchant ship,” and thus it was not, at least formally, an argument that 
Doenitz could not be convicted because the U.S. was guilty too. Nevertheless, it was close. 
“[I]t was as clear as clear could be,” wrote Taylor, “that if Doenitz and Raeder deserved to 
hang for sinking ships without warning, so did Nimitz.” Id. at 409. The Tribunal sentenced 
Doenitz to ten years, the lightest sentence of any defendant. 
123 G.A. Res. 95 (I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
2007] Nuremberg's Contributions to International Law 89 
Conclusion 
 The trial at Nuremberg would not have taken place without the 
determination of the United States and its Allies to make it happen. It 
was conceived and shaped by months of internal debate in Washington 
and a long summer of negotiation in London that gave birth to the 
Charter, which produced the trial and gave the law to the judges. From 
that process, political in its conception and juridical in its execution, 
came a renovation of international law that has deªned human rights, 
and even created human rights law. Individual responsibility for viola-
tions of human rights, international concern with a government’s treat-
ment of its own citizens, and accountability through a judicial process 
that gives the defendants important rights and places the ªnal decision 
in the hands of judges and not military commanders or even presi-
dents, are all, now, fundamental principles of international law and 
politics. Nuremberg made them so. 
